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1. Introduction
Since its inception, generative grammar has never failed to recognize
that its ultimate task is to explicate the issue as to how and why only hu-
man beings come to use language with very limited input of linguistic
data within a few years from their birth. In his talk (around 1965), for ex-
ample, Chomsky remarked that the general intellectual interest of linguis-
tic study lies not in the particular facts that it reveals, useful as these
may be for pedagogical purposes or other applications, but in the conclu-
sions that can be drawn concerning linguistic universals, ultimately, con-
cerning the nature of human mental processes . Although the interest
mentioned in the above remark has been placed, throughout the history of
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generative grammar, at the core of the issues that generative grammar is
to resolve, it was not until the late 1980s that time so matured as to make
a direct and explicit approach to this central issue of generative grammar.
Around 1990, the theoretical achievements that had been induced from
the results of the studies that analyzed (i.e. described) linguistic data by
means of the theoretical devices of generative grammar began to converge;
as a consequence, it stimulated researchers who were more curious about
the mechanism of human language faculty than human language itself;
hence, it greatly enhanced the straight exploration into the core issue
about the nature of the mental processes within the human language fac-
ulty.
Along the trend of the aforementioned research project, a number of
researchers have been actively investigating various aspects of the Mini-
malist program over the past decade. Although it is obvious that impor-
tant researches as well as the concepts and terminology of the Minimalist
program should be both familiar and invigorating, the status quo is that,
at times, they may seem alien and their ramifications seem obscure. This
is solely because the program itself is rapidly developing with radical and
abrupt revisions of the most basic assumptions of the preceding decades of
linguistic research, discarding many of the central principles, relations,
and technical mechanisms which have been both the objects and tools of
study since, at least, the GB era.
In what follows, I will, first, sketch out the kernel thesis of the Mini-
malist Program proposed and elaborated in the recent articles by Chom-
sky (1998, 1999, 2001) from a rather general viewpoint without going into
technically minute details. Then, I will make a conjecture on the possibil-
ity of eliminating constituent structures in syntactic theory: It will be
demonstrated that, although the conception concerning the total elimina-
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tion of constituent structures seemingly forfeits tremendous things of
great importance, it is, indeed, righteously requisite, under the strongest
Minimalist thesis, for the bona fide exploration into the core issue of gen-
erative grammar.
2. Essentials of Minimalism
The ideas developed and elaborated in the series of papers collected in
his book The Minimalist Program (MIT Press, 1995), in which Chomsky
radically revised the Principles and Parameters framework, constitute the
manifesto of the Minimalist program. For the purpose of exploring the
core issue of generative grammar, the Minimalist program questions some
of the most basic assumptions of the preceding decades of linguistic re-
search and jettisons many of the central principles, relations, and techni-
cal mechanisms. At the same time, other familiar properties of the theory
persist, though sometimes in surprising forms.
Over the past few years, Chomsky has written another series of pa-
pers (Chomsky (1998, 1999, 2001)) in which he further submits the accu-
mulated assumptions to profound and extensive scrutiny, paring away
technical accretions to reveal a compelling vision of the language faculty
as a biologically-based system with surprisingly elegant computational
properties. More than before, these papers are overgrown with the de-
pendence upon the conviction that human language faculty is a biological
organ with a marvelous capacity of computation. According to this quite
strong thesis, Chomsky (2001) goes so far as to claim that we have to seek
a level of explanation deeper than explanatory adequacy, asking not only
what the properties of language are, but why they are that way, and sug-
gest that these questions, optimally, are best approached by hypothesizing
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that UG is conditioned by nothing but the interface conditions (ICs)(1) and
the general properties of computational efficiency. He calls this hypothesis
“strongest minimalist thesis (SMT)”, and maintains that this thesis, which
guarantees that properties of language have a principled explanation
(which goes beyond explanatory adequacy), lets us accessible to the core
issue of generative grammar.
3. Eliminating Constituent Structures
Recall, once again, that the premier Minimalist thesis is that there
should be no operations or conditions that make reference to any concep-
tually unnecessary entity in the syntactic theory of natural language. Let
us explore this thesis in a rather radical fashion.
Now I would like to consider the notion “constituent” or “constituent
structure”. Constituent (or phrase) structures (or phrase markers) have
long been alleged to be subsistent in the theory of grammar. But, in what
follows, I attempt to show that they are not a necessary substance in syn-
tactic theory. Therefore, I will show that in the narrow syntax in the
sense of Chomsky (1995), there are no operation or condition that makes
reference to constituent structures. This quite radical proposal, however,
is pungently demanded by the SMT.
Following, entirely, the ideas presented in Collins & Ura (2001), I pro-
pose that constituent structures be eliminated not only because they are
representational, but rather they have no conceptual necessity. Put differ-
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ently, the rationale behind the proposal is that the SMT disputes the sub-
sistence of such notions as constituents and constituent structures because
they do not fall into the categories that condition the form of UG as a bio-
logical system with a computationally marvelous properties. As an imme-
diate consequence of the proposal of eliminating constituent structures, it
is not only tree diagrams (and their subsidiary notions such as nodes,
branches, etc.) and (labeled) brackets, but also sisterhood, c-commanding,
and even domination that cannot be postulated in the theory of grammar.
This proposal is, therefore, a natural extension of the idea elaborated by
Collins (2001), which is a refinement of Chomsky’s (1994) conception of
“Bare Phrase Structure” on the basis of more rigid scrutiny from the mini-
malist viewpoint.
Historically, it has long been assumed that phrase structures (or
phrase markers) can be identified with trees in graph theory, and trees
are formally defined as a collocation of nodes and labels (see Partee et al.
(1990)). If Collins (2001) is right in claiming that no labels are needed in
syntactic theory (and I assume so), then it is no longer possible to define
trees or constituent structures by utilizing labels. Two possibilities re-
main: First, assuming that trees and constituent structures are necessary
in syntax, we seek for a possibility to define them without labels; and, sec-
ond, we simply expel those notions from syntactic theory as an unneces-
sary substance.
In fact, the SMT disputes constituent structure as a necessary notion,
so that we are to take the latter approach. But, what leads to the conclu-
sion that the notion “constituent structure” or “constituent” lacks concep-
tual necessity under the SMT? Recall that no entities are conceptually
necessary under the SMT unless (i) they are reduced to the ICs, or (ii)
they are resolved into the general properties of computational efficiency.
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Obviously, it is impossible to accredit the notion “constituent structure” or
“constituent” with either of the property described in (i) or the one in (ii).
Consequently, these notions and any construct defined by using them
should be dispelled from the theory of syntax if we pursue the SMT in the
sincerest fashion.
Before we go into the technical details concerning a theory without
constituent structure, it is worth while deliberating on the raison d’être of
constituents in syntax, because it might well be conceived that not a few
readers conjecture that no one can deny the psychological reality of con-
stituent structures. Since constituents or constituent structures have been
very common and familiar since the tradition of the structural linguistics,
they seem to be inevitable in order to refer to something about any syn-
tactic relation, and, thus, it seems prima facie almost impossible to imag-
ine syntax without them. A metaphor is in order to make it easier and
clearer to imagine syntax without constituents(2). Suppose that there are
two magnets in your hand, each of which differs from the other in color. If
the distance between the two magnets happens to be reduced, they attract
each other, and then come together; that is, there seems to have emerged
a unit of two magnets in your hand. Then, someone comes and asks you
what you have in your hand. Do you reply to him that you have two mag-
nets and a unit of them? The unit itself is not a subsistent entity in the
real world. Owing exclusively to the magnetic force between them, the two
magnets act as a unit. I would like to say that constituents are analogous
to the unit of two magnets in this example, and more importantly, the
syntactic operation, Merge, is analogous to the magnetic force between
them.
Here is another metaphor: Our solar system may be viewed as a unit
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which consists of the sun, the nine planets, and the satellites of the plan-
ets. Suppose that an intergalactic rocket is approaching to our solar sys-
tem. The crew may recognize the solar system as a unit if they make a
close observation of every star’s movement in the solar system. But, for
the purpose of sailing their rocket safely through the solar system, it is
not necessary for them to recognize the solar system as a unit. Rather, it
suffices for them to know the movements of the stars which are relevant
to the course of their rocket. In other words, the solar system per se does
not exist at all for their purpose. The subsistence of the solar system is
not necessary and, hence, it is regarded as a kind of artifact. Now, recall
that no dependence on any conceptually unnecessary conceptions is per-
mitted under the SMT. If we are right in arguing that constituents (and
constituent structures) are analogous to the solar system in the above
metaphor, they should be avoided in the theory of grammar.
In order to make our point still clearer, more on the metaphor about
the solar system is in order. It seems to us that our solar system itself
consists of several units, because the earth has a satellite, the moon, Mars
has two satellites, and so on. Take the earth and the moon, for example.
Why does it seem to us that they form a unit? If we take into considera-
tion these two stars alone, then it is not necessary to regard them as a
unit. The moon is merely subjugated by the earth in its movement: While
the earth’s movement is free from the moon, the moon is bound to revolve
around the earth for the reason that they attract each other by their
gravitation. Here no unit is necessary to be assumed, though it is possible
to assume a unit because they have a relation; one subjugates the other
(subjugation-relation). Now let us take into consideration the sun in addi-
tion to the earth and the moon. Then, it is easy for us to regard the earth
and the moon as a unit when we consider the relations that hold among
９７Prolegomena to a Theory of Syntax without Constituent Structure
them. The relation between the sun and the earth is the same as the one
between the earth and the moon: The movement of one is subjugated by
the other. But, in this case, the entity that is subjugated by something
subjugates some other thing. Note, here, that the subjugation-relations
are interlaced cumulatively . Moreover , the sun holds the same
subjugation-relations with the other planets and their satellites. Thus, the
motivation to regard each set of a planet and its satellite(s) as a unit is
strengthened because it is rather difficult, without regarding each set of a
planet and its satellite(s) as a unit, to calculate all the relations that hold
among the sun, the nine planets, and their satellites at once. But, it is
very important to notice that the unit of the earth and the moon, for ex-
ample, is not a subsistent entity in the galaxy; rather, what really exist
are the earth and the moon, and there is a relation between them. Again,
I would like to emphasize that a unit has no subsistence and there is only
a relation there.
Now I would like to conclude that a constituent is a unit, and a con-
stituent structure (or phrase structure), which is constructed by more than
one constituent, is an interwoven layer of units. I therefore go on to claim
that these notions are not a necessary concept in syntactic theory. In what
follows I will show that, when it seems that more than one syntactic ob-
ject forms a constituent, there is no such subsistence as constituent and
what really exists is only a syntactic relation that is created by checking
of formal features in the course of CHL, just as the case of the aforemen-
tioned metaphor of the solar system, in which the unit that consists of the
earth and the moon does not exist and what really/physically exists is
only the subjugation-relation between them. In the minimalist viewpoint,
it is natural to say that relations that are created by checking of formal
features (i.e., checking-relations) really exist because they should be inter-
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preted at the interface levels (third person agreement, for example, should
be legible both at PF and at LF, because its morphophonological realiza-
tion should be guaranteed at PF and its meaning (especially, in the case
of some Romance languages with null subjects) should be interpreted at
LF). In other words, checking relations obey the ICs; thus, regarding them
as a syntactic object is very natural under the SMT. Therefore, I would
like to argue that there is no constituent and what really exists in syntax
is a checking relation, and that what seems to us to be a constituent
structure is an interwoven layer of checking relations.
Of course, when we are trying to comprehend the whole perspective of
the solar system, it is easier to imagine it by regarding the earth and the
moon as a unit. Similarly, when we are trying to analyze a sentence (a
construct that is created by applying syntactic operations to syntactic ob-
jects in a legitimate way), it may be easier to exploit a constituent or a
constituent structure. But the SMT demands no reference to any concep-
tually unnecessary notion. Hence, the theory of grammar should not refer
to a constituent (or any concept defined by using them).
4. Preliminaries to a Theory without Constituent Structure
Now that no constituents exist in syntax, the next question is: how
can we construct a theory of syntax without them? In the previous section
I hinted that checking relations are really substantial entities in a theory
of syntax. Checking relations are created by legitimate syntactic opera-
tions such as Merge and Move/Attract (or Agree). Note that, in any theory
without constituents, it must be the case that these syntactic operations
also manipulate relations to create another relations. Thus, given a theory
as to how to execute the syntactic operations properly, we can construct,
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without referring to constituents, any structural or representational no-
tions which we used to utilize in syntax. One of the most promising lines
for the purpose of establishing such a theory is to explore the notion of lo-
cal economy (Ura 1995, 1997, and Collins 1997), but I leave it to future
research (see Collins & Ura 2001 for some further elaboration of the the-
ory outlined here).
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